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LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES TO GOVERN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 4, 1984, two embryos, whose parents had been
killed in a plane crash, remained frozen in storage in Australia as a
committee of scientists, philosophers, theologians, and legal experts
determined their fate.' The parents had been attempting to have a
baby through in vitro fertilization (IVF).' The embryos were the
product of eggs removed from the mother, Elsa Rios, and sperm
from an anonymous donor. Because the Rios' did not anticipate pre-
deceasing the embryos, they left no instructions for their disposition
in that event. The scholarly committee recommended that the em-
bryos be destroyed. Other groups, particularly those opposed to abor-
tion, demanded that the embryos be thawed and implanted in surro-
gate mothers.8 Government officials were inclined to follow the
committee's recommendation because the embryos would be difficult
to donate without the parents' consent. Later, however, the Austra-
lian government, responding to strong opposition to destruction of
the embryos, determined that they should not be destroyed." The di-
lemma confronting the Australian government is a recent example of
a scientific development that has advanced beyond existing legally
defined rights and responsibilities. The result of this scientific devel-
opment which is outpacing the law is that courts are faced with such
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1. San Jose Mercury News, Sept. 4, 1984, at 7A.
2. This technique is hereinafter referred to as IVF. See infra notes 16-17 and accompa-
nying text.
3. Surrogate motherhood occurs when a woman contracts to bear a child for another in
return for money. Surrogate motherhood and the legal status of the embryo are major issues
beyond the scope of this comment. This comment cannot avoid these issues because they are so
intertwined, but they will be referred to indirectly. Presently, a child can be born with up to
five parents if one adds up donors, surrogates, natural, and legal parents. The possibilities are
illustrated as follows: 1) ovum from mother + sperm from father = child born of mother, 2)
ovum from mother + sperm from donor = child born of mother, 3) ovum from donor +
sperm from father = child born of mother, 4) ovum from donor + sperm from donor = child
born of mother, 5) ovum from donor + sperm from father = child born of surrogate, 6) ovum
from donor + sperm from donor = child born of surrogate, 7) ovum from mother + sperm
from father = child born of surrogate, 8) ovum from mother + sperm from donor = child
born of surrogate. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46. See infra
notes 40, 100-04 and accompanying text.
4. San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 24, 1984, at 12A.
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unforeseen legal and moral issues as: the unclear rights and liabili-
ties of parents and donors; the uncertain legal status of the embryo;
the possibility of widespread genetic manipulation and its conse-
quences; and the potential of permanent physical and mental injury
to mother and child. The problem is compounded by the highly emo-
tional nature of issues which are related to the production or termi-
nation of human life.
New reproductive technologies become increasingly available
without any regulations to address this multitude of legal issues.
California law must address these new reproductive possibilities in
order to guide -interested parties and physicians through uncertain
and potentially litigious areas.
This comment proposes statutory guidelines to eliminate the le-
gal uncertainties concerning IVF and embryo transfer (ET),' specifi-
cally when they are employed for procreative' purposes.' In doing
so, this comment concludes that existing statutes governing artificial
insemination8 and fetal research' should be inapplicable to some as-
pects of IVF and ET.10 Legislation is necessary in order to advise
persons of their legal rights so that they can make increasingly com-
monplace procreative decisions. The courts should not be left to cre-
ate ad hoc remedies after problems arise.
Before proposing guidelines for state regulation of IVF and ET,
it is necessary to determine whether such action is within a state's
power or whether regulating these procedures infringes upon a con-
stitutionally protected fundamental right. The issue is whether the
right to decide to resort to IVF and/or to ET for procreative pur-
poses is one that is guaranteed by the United States Constitution. No
laws currently exist which specifically cover IVF and ET." The
only "procreative" issues that have as yet been examined for pur-
poses of constitutional analysis are contraception and abortion. These
issues will be discussed by analogy to show that a right of access to
IVF and ET is a constitutionally protected "fundamental" right if
5. This technique is hereinafter referred to as ET. See infra notes 18-19 and accompa-
nying text.
6. This comment will address only the clinical context, in which the procedures are used
for procreative purposes rather than research.
7. The distinction between the research and clinical contexts is important because each
context involves very different rights. Freedom of inquiry and the right to do research are
clearly separate from the right to procreate.
8. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
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one is infertile. 2 Once this fundamental right is recognized, regula-
tions which are found to infringe upon the right are subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny. Whether and to what extent IVF and ET
may be regulated depends upon whether the state of California can
successfully assert a "compelling" interest'" which justifies the regu-
lation. Once a compelling state interest has been established as a ba-
sis for regulation, the suggested guidelines will define the rights and
responsibilities of interested parties. For example, the would-be par-
ents must provide for the disposition of embryos that are not im-
planted. 4 In addition, there must be a standard of care for physi-
cians which provides protective donor screening.' 5 These guidelines
are necessary because as long as infertility is a problem, technology
will be employed to overcome it. Before the legal problems can be
analyzed, however, an understanding of the procedures involved and
the legal issues associated with each is necessary.
II. THE PROCEDURES
A. In Vitro Fertilization
In the course of IVF, the woman undergoes a surgical proce-
dure known as a laparoscopy to remove an egg (or eggs) from an
ovary. The egg(s) is put in a petri dish containing a medium condu-
cive to its development. Sperm of the husband or donor'" is then
added to the dish, and the egg is fertilized. Once fertilized, the egg is
inserted into the woman's uterus through a tube that passes through
the vagina. In the uterus, the embryo implants itself and begins to
grow as any normally conceived embryo. This is the classic "test-
tube" baby. Often, more than one egg is removed from the ovary,
fertilized, and implanted, in order to increase the odds of a successful
pregnancy. Thus, multiple births are common. If the "extra" eggs
12. See infra notes 45-84 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
15. Sperm should be tested for gonorrhea. The donor's blood should be tested for syphil-
lis and hepatitis. Donors with known genetic defects should be ruled out. Family history of
mental retardation, congenital defects, or neurological disorders should mandate rejection as a
donor. Screening should be done for the traits of Tay-Sachs and sickle cell anemia. Tests
should be administered to insure compatible Rh factors between donors and recipients. Alcohol
and drug abusers as well as persons who are exposed to radiation on the job should be pre-
cluded from being donors. Any other known test that might screen out possible causes of birth
defects or disease should be administered. See L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A CON-
SUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILI-
ZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 167-68 (1984).
16. See supra note 3.
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are not implanted, they can be frozen or donated."
B. Embryo Transfer
1. With In Vitro Fertilization
This process is similar to IVF except that the egg fertilized in
the petri dish is that of a donor rather than the mother. Because
synchronization is important to the success of this procedure, the egg
comes from a donor whose menstrual cycle matches that of the recip-
ient. The donor egg is fertilized by sperm of the recipient's husband
or by sperm from a donor.
2. With In Vivo Fertilization
ET can also be performed with the donor egg fertilized in vivo.
This is distinguished from in vitro fertilization in that the donor's
egg is fertilized in her body through artificial insemination.18 After
five days, a plastic tube is inserted into her uterus. The embryo is
withdrawn through this tube and then inserted into the uterus of the
recipient.1 A woman who actively contributes to the conception by
the use of her uterus rather than passively donating the egg may
have a stronger legal parental claim to the resulting child. Thus, it is
imperative with this procedure that parental rights and responsibili-
ties be clearly defined because a third party, the egg donor, is ac-
tively contributing to the conception of the child.
C. Health Risks
There are inherent health risks with these new medical proce-
dures that cannot be avoided. The risks to the mother are minimal2"
although more research is necessary." Because these are medical
procedures, existing standards of duc care, to which reasonably pru-
dent physicians are held,'2 already apply. However, there are no ex-
17. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
18. There is, of course, the possibility that the donor could be naturally inseminated
through intercourse.
19. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 249.
20. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TiME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 52 (quoting Dr. Ervin
Nichols, director of practice activity for the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology).
21. Id.
22. "[Dloctors must use all care which is reasonable in light of their superior learning
and experience, and any special skills, knowledge or training they may personally have over
and above what is normally possessed by persons in the field ...the doctor must have and
use the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the pro-
fession in good standing; and a doctor will be liable if harm results because he does not have
[Vol. 26
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isting standards to insure that donated genetic materials are free
from known defects or diseases. A large-scale study"3 by two geneti-
cists and an endocrinologist revealed that many doctors do little
screening of donors in connection with artificial insemination. 4 An
inquiry into donor family history is limited to the donor indicating
"family health problems" on a short list of common diseases."5
Sometimes doctors use medical students as donors and trust that the
students would not lie about the status of their health.2 Although it
is possible to test for over twenty-five hundred identifiable genetic
disorders for which a donor might not know he is a carrier,2 7 these
tests are often not done. The report concluded that "the screening of
donors is inadequate."2 The lack of proper donor screening adds
substantially to the health risks to children born through the proce-
dures. Available testing must be done in order to avoid the known
health risks inherent in the donation and use of defective genetic
materials. These risks can be reduced by implementation of donor
screening standards that eliminate those donors affected with genetic
disease or defect.
The present lack of a standard for donor screening leaves many
legal issues unsettled. Perhaps health care providers could be held
liable for wrongful life causes of action for children who are born
tragically defective or genetically diseased.' 9 But people who donate
them. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND- KEETON ON TORTS 185-87 (5th ed. 1984).
23. Curie-Cohen, Lutrell, Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Do-
nor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979).
24. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 169 (citing Curie-Cohen, Lutrell, Shapiro, Cur-






29. A wrongful life action was found to exist on behalf of a child caused to be born with
genetic defects. Medical personnel performing genetic testing negligently failed to inform par-
ents of the possibility that their child might be born with Tay-Sachs disease. The court found
"no difficulty in ascertaining and finding the existence of a duty owed by medical laboratories
engaged in genetic testing to parents and their as yet unborn children to use ordinary care in
administration of available tests for the purpose of providing information concerning potential
genetic defects in the unborn." Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,
828, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). But see Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954,
182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). In Turpin, the California Supreme Court allowed special but not
general damages to a child born with impaired hearng after health care providers failed to
advise the child's parents of the possibility of the hereditary condition. General damages were
denied because it was impossible to determine whether the child suffered an injury at being
born impaired as opposed to not being born at all. Special damages were allowed to cover
extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment. 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d
1986]
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defective or diseased genetic materials are not liable for the inevitable
consequences of such donation. Without a standard of donor screen-
ing which creates a duty to avoid known genetic disaster, no one is
ultimately liable for the defective, unwanted children who are born
as a result.
III. EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE RESTRICTIONS SHOULD
NOT APPLY TO IVF AND ET
A. Federal Regulations
The birth of the first "test-tube" baby in 1978 and an applica-
tion for a grant to conduct IVF research prompted the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and its Ethics Advisory
Board (EAB) to undertake a study of the ethical, scientific, social,
and legal issues raised by IVF."0 The Report found that the only
existing federal involvement with IVF is an HEW regulation3'
which conditions funding of any proposal involving human in vitro
fertilization upon review by the Ethics Advisory Board. 2 This regu-
lation would not govern IVF and/or ET in the private, clinical con-
text because there is no eligibility for HEW funding. The EAB Re-
port noted that regulation of these procedures at the state level is not
preempted by federal law.33 Therefore, states are free to regulate in
at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (1982).
30. ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD OF THE DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WEL-
FARE, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, reprinted in 44 FED. REG. 35,034 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as EAB Report].
31. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d) (1978).
32. EAB Report, supra note 30, at 35,047.
No application or proposal involving human in vitro fertilization may be
funded by the Department or any component thereof until the application or
proposal has been reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board and the Board has
rendered advice as to its acceptability from an ethical standpoint. [footnote
omitted]
With respect to the fertilization of human ova in vitro, it is expected that
the Board will consider the extent to which current technology permits the con-
tinued development of such ova, as well as the legal and ethical issues surround-
ing the initiation and disposition of such products of research.
With respect to implantation of fertilized human ova, it is expected that the
Board will consider such factors as the safety of the technique (with respect to
offspring) as demonstrated in animal studies and clarification of the legal re-
sponsibilities of the donor and recipient parent(s) as well as the research person-
nel. [footnote omitted]
Id.
33. HEW regulations state that nothing in the subpart pertaining to research involving
pregnant women, fetuses, and in vitro fertilization, "shall be construed as indicating that com-
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this area as long as constitutional limits are observed."
B. California Law
IVF and ET are new procedures, therefore there is no Califor-
nia statute or case law precisely on point. Statutes governing artifi-
cial insemination" and fetal research 6 are the closest existing law
that is likely to serve as precedent. However, these statutes are fo-
cused upon the discrete practices of artificial insemination and fetal
research rather than advanced technologies in conceiving children
and should not be construed to apply.
1. Artificial Insemination
California Civil Code section 7005" providesin pertinent part:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with
semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby
conceived . . . . The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of a child thereby conceived."
If the husband's sperm is used, no legal issue arises because the child
is the genetic child of the husband and wife. With IVF, artificial
insemination is not employed so the statute does not directly apply.
However, there is the legal presumption that if a husband gives con-
sent to his wife to employ artificial conception techniques, he is
treated as the father. This presumption could apply by analogy to
IVF.39
pliance with the procedures set forth . . . will in any way render inapplicable pertinent state
or local laws bearing upon activities covered by this subpart." 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1978).
34. "When Congress exercises a granted power, the federal law may supersede state
laws and preempt state authority, because of the operation of the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI
. . . . The Court's preemption rulings often turn on a determination of congressional intent in
the setting of the particular text, history and purposes of the federal legislation involved." G.
GUNTHER, CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 317-18 (11th ed. 1985). The EAB Report explicitly stated
that state law was not preempted, thus clearly expressing the legislative intent.
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
36. CAL.. HEAI.TH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1983).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
38. CAL.. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
39. The artificial insemination statute is part of the Uniform Parentage Act, CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 7000-18 (West 1973). The Act concerns the establishment of parent and child rela-
tionships, questions of paternity, and issues of adoption. The analogy is grounded in the fact
19861
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A conflict arises if a child were born through in vivo fertiliza-
tion using artificial insemination because the parental presumption
in the statute which treats the woman and her husband as the legal
parents would also consider the egg donor and her husband as legal
parents. It is necessary to overcome the artificial insemination statute
in order to achieve the desired result that only the embryo recipient
and her husband be treated as parents.'" Any proposed regulation to
govern IVF with in vivo fertilization (as opposed to in vitro fertili-
zation) must stipulate that it overrides the parental presumption of
the artificial insemination statute so that only the embryo recipient,
and her spouse if she is married, are treated as the legal parents.
2. Fetal Research
Most states, including California, have statutes governing fetal
research. 1 Some are more general than others and would preclude
IVF as well as ET because the procedures would be included in the
definition of the kinds of fetal research which are prohibited."2 The
California statute, however, covers fetal research only in connection
with the by-products of abortion. The statute reads in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person to use any aborted product of
human conception, other than fetal remains, for any type of sci-
that similar issues of paternity and legitimacy are inherent in both artificial insemination and
IVF. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983) codifies California case law holding that a
child born of artificial insemination is legitimate. See generally People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d
280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968) (holding that artificial insemination is not
adultery).
40. The desired result would be different in a surrogate mother contract situation. In
that case, the embryo recipient would be a surrogate mother and the individual or couple
hiring her would want to be treated as parents. Such contracts would probably not be upheld
although the issue has not yet been tested in American courts. The statute governing artificial
insemination creates a presumption that the natural, in this case surrogate, mother and her
husband are the legal parents. In addition, 24 states have statutes prohibiting paying a mother
for giving up her child. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970). The issue of surrogate
mother contracts is another issue that needs to be resolved in the area of new conception
methods. See generally Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 291 (1982); Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal
Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 467 (1982); Comment, Parenthood by
Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IOWA L. REV. 385 (1981-82); Brophy, A
Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1981-82); Comment, Surro-
gate Motherhood in California: Legislative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341 (1980-81).
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1983).
42. Michigan, for example, forbids research on a live human embryo if its health or life
may be jeopordized. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685-2692 (West 1980). Minnesota
prohibits experimenting on live human conceptus, including one conceived ex utero, unless the
experiment protects the health or life of the conceptus or unless evidence has shown that type
of experiment to be harmless. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421-422 (West Supp. 1982).
[Vol. 26
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entific or laboratory research or for any other kind of experi-
mentation or study, except to protect or preserve the life and
health of the fetus. "Fetal remains," as used in this section,
means a lifeless product of conception regardless of the duration
of pregnancy. A fetus shall not be deemed to be lifeless for the
purposes of this section, unless there is an absence of a discern-
ible heartbeat.43
IVF would not be covered by the statute because IVF does not
involve an "aborted product." The egg is fertilized outside the uterus
and the resulting embryo is implanted in the woman, not withdrawn.
The statute could, however, affect ET with in vivo fertilization. The
flushing technique used to withdraw the embryo from the woman
donor could be considered an abortion, and the California statute
may thus prohibit the technique. This would depend on how broadly
the phrase "aborted product of human conception" would be con-
strued. No cases, as yet, have interpreted the statute in the context of
ET with in vivo fertilization. However, it could be argued in sup-
port of ET that reimplanting the embryo in the recipient is "pro-
tect[ing] or preserv[ing] the life and health of the fetus."" In addi-
tion, the statute's actual focus is on "research and experimentation."
Thus, if IVF and ET become commonplace, then they are no longer
"research and experimentation." Concluding that these statutes
should not apply, constitutional issues remain concerning the state's
ability to directly restrict the availability of these procedures.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES REGARDING GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATION OF IVF AND ET
Governmental regulation of IVF and ET falls within a state's
broad power to regulate affairs involving public health and safety.' 5
43. CAi.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1983).
44. Id.
45. "It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of
conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital part of a state's
police power." Barsky v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 347
U.S. 442, 449 (1953). "According to settled principles the police power of a state must be held
to embrace at least such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as
will protect the public health and the public safety." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
23 (1824) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S.
465 (1877), Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877); Lauton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1893)). One commentator has noted, "[Tlhere is little serious dispute about the proposition
that the legislature may, indeed should, act to preserve and foster the health, safety, and socio-
economic well-being of the people." Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 724
(1976).
1986]
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The regulatory power stems from the silence of the Constitution in
this area as well as the tenth amendment. 46 Because the federal gov-
ernment consists of only enumerated powers, the lack of a grant of
power to the federal government implies that such power is reserved
to the states. State actions are valid unless prohibited explicitly or
implicitly by the Constitution. 47 Thus, a state may constitutionally
regulate many areas of health care because such regulation is not
prohibited by the Constitution. However, the regulation must still
meet the requirements of due process;4" there must be a rational ba-
sis for the regulation.49 The regulation must be " 'rationally related'
to a 'constitutionally permissible' purpose."'" If, however, the regu-
lation infringes upon a constitutionally protected fundamental right,
a state must show a "compelling" interest and the regulation must be
narrowly tailored to that interest."1 This distinction cannot be over-
emphasized for it determines the level of scrutiny to be given to a
regulation. In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,"' the Su-
preme Court provided the framework for analysis: "We must decide,
first, whether [state legislation] . . . impinges upon a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly protected by The Constitution, thereby
requiring strict judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers
46. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X, § 1.
47. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (1978).
48. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (statute requiring state to keep file of
patients receiving certain drugs is valid exercise of police power):
At the very least, it would seem clear that the State's vital interest in con-
trolling the distribution of dangerous drugs would support a decision to experi-
ment with new techniques for control . . . . It follows that the legislature's
enactment of the patient i.d. requirement was a reasonable exercise of New
York's broad police powers.
Id. at 598.
49. "State legislation which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be
held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part . ...
The New York statute challenged . . . is manifestly the product of an orderly and rational
legislative decision." Id. at 597.
50. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S, 56,
74 (1972)).
51. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (state restriction on distribu-
tion of contraceptives struck down). "'Compelling' is of course the key word; where a decision
as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a
burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn
to express only those interests." Id. at 686.
52. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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som e legitim ate, articulated state purpose . ....""
Therefore, the first question to be addressed in a constitutional
due process analysis is whether the right asserted is constitutionally
protected. It must be determined whether individuals seeking access
to IVF and/or ET, for purposes of procreation," are exercising a
fundamental legal right.
The constitutionally protected legal right to reproduce by means
of IVF and/or ET would be found among the penumbras of the
right to privacy in connection with marriage," contraception, 6 and
procreation.'" A fundamental right of access to IVF and/or ET can
be found by drawing close analogies. Although the cases discussed
below which establish the right of privacy in connection with mar-
riage, contraception, and procreation are a logical starting point,
these cases did not consider, and do not directly define, analogous
rights in the context of IVF and/or ET. If a fundamental right is
found to exist, then IVF and ET can still be regulated if the right is
not infringed upon," and if the regulation rationally furthers a legit-
imate state interest." If the regulation was found to infringe upon a
fundamental right, it would be upheld only upon a showing that it
was necessary to further a compelling state interest and that the reg-
ulation was closely tailored to that interest.'0
A. The Right To Privacy Within Marriage
The right to privacy within marriage was recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.'1 In Griswold, the Court
struck down a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives. The
majority held that the statute violated the right of marital privacy
protected by the Constitution.' The Court stated that marriage is:
a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by sev-
53. Id. at 17.
54. See supra note 7.
55. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the constitutionally pro-
tected area of privacy within the marital relationship).
56. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating statute restricting
distribution, sale, advertisement, and display of contraceptives).
57. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing that individuals have a
right to be free from unwarranted state interference with procreative capabilities).
58. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. The Court included the right of marital privacy within the penumbra of specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. But see infra note 84.
1986]
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eral constitutional guarantees. And [the present case] concerns a
law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals
by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that rela-
tionship . . . . The very idea is repulsive to the notions of pri-
vacy surrounding the marriage relationship."
Based upon this language, an infertile couple could assert that to
prohibit their access to new conception techniques is to interfere with
the right of privacy within marriage. This argument is supported by
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold. Justice Goldberg
noted that the rights being protected were those of "marital privacy
and [the right] to marry and raise a family.""" Children are a vital,
central aspect of marriage and family. Because privacy within mar-
riage and family is protected, the decision to have children should
also be protected. The fact that a couple is infertile strengthens the
argument that a state regulation barring access to IVF and ET un-
reasonably interferes with the privacy of the marital relationship.
Prohibiting the use of new conception techniques effectively denies
an infertile couple the right to procreate. The privacy right recog-
nized by Griswold includes the right to choose whether to have a
child. This decision is certainly within the borders of "privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship.""
In order to protect an infertile couple's access to IVF and ET, it
is necessary to carry the logic of this argument one step further. If
the right to choose to have children is a protected right, then perhaps
every available manner of procreation should also be protected.
When one cannot have a child naturally, the right protected by Gris-
wold should include not only the decision whether to have a child,
but also access to safe, new, technical means of conceiving a child.
Opponents of IVF and ET would read Griswold more nar-
rowly. This narrow reading would only protect the right of married
persons to control the outcome of intercourse. A narrow reading is
consistent with the actual language of the holding. By contrast, one
must adopt an extremely liberal construction of Griswold in order to
include the right of access to IVF and ET within its holding. Never-
theless, the language quoted above does indicate that what is being
protected is not only the right to control the outcome of intercourse
but a zone of privacy surrounding the marital relationship.66 If a
63. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 495 (5-4 decision) (Goldberg, J., concurring).




right of access to IVF and ET were protected by Griswold, a state
may still regulate the procedures if so doing would further important
state interests 67 and if the regulations were narrowly tailored so as
not to infringe upon privacy within marriage. This required tailor-
ing could be accomplished by restricting access to IVF and ET to
married, infertile couples. However, a regulation this narrow could
not withstand an attack under the right to privacy in connection with
contraception and procreation. Therefore, the privacy right protected
by Griswold is not ultimately necessary as a foundation for the
guidelines to be suggested in this comment.
B. The Right to Privacy in the Decision Whether to Bear or Beget a
Child (The Right to Contraception)
In Eisenstadt v. Baird" and Carey v. Population Services In-
ternational,69 the Supreme Court held that statutes which restrict
access to contraceptives are unconstitutional. In Eisenstadt, the
Court stated:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."0
If an individual or a couple is infertile, the decision to resort to IVF
or ET is essentially whether to bear or beget a child. It is not a
question of "how" but "whether" to bear a child if such means af-
ford the only way to conceive a child.
In Carey, the Court recognized that:
Read in the light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that
the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State . . . . This
is so not because there is an independent fundamental "right of
access to contraceptives," but because such access in essential to
exercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in
matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the
holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.7 1
Although these cases specifically address the decision not to have
67. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
68. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a statute which effectively prevented
distribution of contraceptives to single but not married persons).
69. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See supra notes 51 and 56.
70. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
71. 431 U.S. at 687-89.
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a child, the above language supports an individual's right of access to
IVF and ET by focusing on the decisionmaking aspect of childbear-
ing. In Carey, the statute prohibiting contraceptives was struck down
because it imposed a "significant burden on the right of the individu-
als to use contraceptives if they choose to do so."'72 The same can be
said of restrictions which might be imposed on access to IVF and
ET. The decision of an infertile individual or couple to use IVF or
ET in order to have a child must be constitutionally protected as
related to matters of childbearing.
Opponents of IVF and ET might argue that the right to decide
whether to bear or beget a child as protected by Eisenstadt78 and
Carey74 does not cover access to procedures necessary to execute the
decision. They might read the cases as carving out a right to be free
from unwarranted government intrusion into the particularly private
act of sexual intercourse and into the question of whether such inter-
course should result in pregnancy. However, the above quoted lan-
guage is not so limited and is clearly intended to protect not only
intercourse and a right of access to contraceptives but also "decisions
in matters of childbearing." '75
C. The Right to Procreate
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,7 the Supreme Court recognized a
right to be free from unwarranted governmental interference with
procreative capabilities. The Court held unconstitutional a statute
which permitted Oklahoma's Attorney General to mandate by court
order the sterilization of criminals who were three times convicted of
certain crimes.7 The majority noted, "We are dealing here with leg-
islation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race."'78 Thus, to deny an infertile person or couple their only
means of conception is to deny them their established, fundamental
right to procreate. Thus, Supreme Court precedent requires that re-
striction of these means, absent a compelling state interest, would be
an unwarranted government interference.
Opponents of IVF and ET might argue that Skinner held that
72. Id. at 689.
73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See supra note 68.
74. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See supra notes 51, 56.
75. 431 U.S. at 688-89.
76. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
77. Id. at 538.
78. Id. at 541.
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it was unconstitutional for a state to surgically terminate an individ-
ual's ability to procreate. That narrow reading might not establish a
constitutional right to a medical technique that would enhance one's
procreative potential. However, the Court in Skinner expressly rec-
ognized procreation as "one of the basic civil rights of man."'" The
Supreme Court broadly recognized "the right to have offspring." 80 It
did not qualify that right as the right not to be sterilized.
D. Summary
It can be concluded that sometimes, for some people, access to
new conception techniques for procreative purposes is a fundamental
right which requires protection. However, guaranteed access to IVF
and ET based on the fundamental right to decide to bear children as
expressed in Eisenstadt"' and Carey," and as the right to procreate
as established by Skinner, is necessarily limited. Only persons who
are prevented from conceiving naturally due to their infertility or
that of their mate could successfully assert that access to these proce-
dures is a fundamental right. The constitutional basis for finding a
fundamental right to these procedures is dependent upon there being
no other way for a person to procreate. The decision to beget a child
is not impaired by restrictions to IVF and ET if one is able to con-
ceive naturally.
The right to privacy within marriage provides access to IVF
and ET only to married persons. However, the rights to procreate
(Skinner) and to decide to bear a child (Eisenstadt, Carey) are not
so limited.
Access to IVF and ET bears sufficient relationship to the areas
of privacy already protected to be logically included in the right to
privacy encompassed in the fourteenth amendment's8" concept of
personal liberty."' There are, however, state interests involved that
79. Id.
80. Id. at 536.
81. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
82. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
83. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
84. Before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it might have been argued that such a
right be included in those personal rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" which are
so fundamental that an undefined penumbra provides them with an independent source of
constitutional protection. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The Court in
Roe v. Wade, however, found such privacy rights to be within the fourteenth amendment. 410
U.S. at 152-53.
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still permit government regulation of these procedures.
V. STATE INTERESTS WARRANTING REGULATION OF
IVF AND ET
Once a fundamental right of access to IVF and/or ET is estab-
lished, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in order to
infringe upon that right, and the regulation must be narrowly tai-
lored to that interest.85 If the regulation does not infringe upon the
fundamental right, the state need only show a rational basis for state
interference." Many public policy considerations are inherent in the
widespread use of IVF and ET. The state has many justifiable inter-
ests which narrowly tailored regulations could rationally further.
The dignity of early human life, the health of embryos, the possibil-
ity of genetic manipulation, and the public policy against surrogate
mother contracts are some state interests which will be discussed
below.
A. "Extra" Embryos
Invariably, availability of the procedures involves the formation
of, and tampering with, early human life. The state has an interest
in the protection of embryos and the dignity of early human life as
presently is evidenced by the fetal research statute. 7 This interest,
however, is more related to the research context than to the clinical
context because research generally does not aim to conceive a healthy
child. However, as discussed earlier, often more eggs are fertilized
than necessary for IVF to increase the odds of a potential preg-
nancy. 8 The state has a reasonable interest in what becomes of these
"extra" embryos even though they are the property89 of those whose
genetic materials produced them.90 Most likely, "extra" embryos
85. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
87. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1983). See supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text.
88. See supra text accompanying note 17.
89. An embryo would not be given "person" status under the law. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Further, one case focused on the destruction of the would-be parents "prop-
erty" in awarding damages for emotional distress following the intentional destruction of fertil-
ized eggs. See Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74-3558, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. April 12,
1978).
90. The state interest involved here would probably not be protecting potential human
life. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), ruled that a state's interest in
protecting potential human life is compelling only when a fetus has reached viability. Id. at
163. The Court defined viability as the point at which a fetus could live outside the mother's
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would be donated or frozen.91 Regulations governing embryo dona-
tion and freezing must be adopted soon if IVF and ET are to be
generally available to infertile people.9" The state has a health inter-
est in the possible harmful effects of freezing and storage techniques.
Also, health risks are associated with embryo donating which stem
from the lack of adequate donor screening and testing. Requiring
donor screening in order to avoid known potential genetic defects and
the transfer of viruses and bacteria would help insure protection of
fetuses and embryos.
Another state concern associated with the "extra" embryos is in
precluding individual or institutional genetic manipulation. The so-
cial implications of large-scale genetic planning justify state regula-
tion of IVF and ET. The thought of private embryo banks, at which
potential parents could choose children with "desirable" genetic
traits is disturbing. Widespread availability of these procedures with-
out regulation or restriction could have profound effects on the ge-
netic make-up of the population."' A few private persons should not
have such control over the genetic fabric of society. Without regula-
tion, even fertile individuals would have the option of producing ge-
netically "superior" offspring. Any practice that could have such far-
reaching effects on society is more than a merely rational state con-
cern and should be regulated for the general welfare.
State regulation of a couple's or an individual's options concern-
ing their extra embryos would not infringe upon the fundamental
right of access to IVF and/or ET. These extra embryos are not
needed for either procedure. Therefore, the state need only have a
rational basis in regulating extra embryos. A state's concern with
general health, safety, and welfare 4 furnishes a rational basis for
regulating what could be done with unused embryos.9
womb "albeit with artificial aid," id., or the point at which it could experience a "meaningful
life." Id. at 163. It is without question that the embryos used in IVF and ET are not viable
according to either definition because they are too early in development. Therefore, the state's
interest in protecting the embryos for the sake of their potential lives would not be compelling.
91. A myriad of legal questions are inherent in the possibility of frozen embryo banks.
Does a frozen embryo have a right to be born? Who dictates its fate? Does a frozen embryo
have inheritance rights? Can one make a living as an "embryo dealer?" Such questions will
have to be resolved and are inextricably tied to the prospect of IVF and ET becoming widely
available.
92. Such regulations would compliment the statutory guidelines to be suggested but are
beyond the scope of this comment. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
93. See generally Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Lib-
erty, 23 HASTINcS L.J. 1401 (1972).
94. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 91.
1986]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B. Discouraging Illegitimacy And Promoting Family
The Supreme Court has recognized that the state has an inter-
est in discouraging illegitimacy and fostering marriage and family."
An outright prohibition of access to IVF and ET to single individu-
als would violate the holding of Eisenstadt v. Baird97 because these
cases established the right to make procreative decisions without re-
gard to marital status. In addition, the California Legislature has not
limited the availability of artificial insemination to married per-
sons. 98 The statute does not provide that a woman must be married
in order to be artificially inseminated.
Even though a state's interest in discouraging illegitimacy might
ultimately rest with concern for the welfare of the child, a prohibi-
tion not tailored to that concern must fail. A state could only restrict
access to IVF and/or ET to married persons by limiting the public
funding of these procedures to married persons. The Supreme Court
held in Maher v. Roe" that a state need not show a compelling
interest in its election to fund only those activities which support its
policies. "There is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternate ac-
tivity consonant with legislative policy . . . . [T]he State's power to
encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily
far broader."' 00 Thus, the state could constitutionally choose to fund
IVF and ET as medical procedures for married persons only. How-
ever, a state could not limit IVF and ET only to married persons if
the procedure were entirely privately funded.
C. Public Policy Against Surrogate Mother Contracts
Another state interest that supports regulation of IVF and ET
is the present policy against surrogate motherhood. 01 A surrogate
mother contracts to bear a child for another in return for money.
Our society as a whole has an aversion to this practice, as reflected
96. Weber v. Aetna Gas & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (declaring Louisiana worker's
compensation statute which denied equal right of recovery to dependent but unacknowledged
illegitimate children unconstitutional). The Court affirmed the State's interest "in protecting
'legitimate family relationships,'. and in the regulation and protection of the family unit."
Id. at 173.
97. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
98. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
99. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
100. Id. at 475-76.
101. See supra note 40.
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in case law'O' as well as statutes 03 which prohibit a mother from
selling her child for adoption. Surrogate contracts would probably be
held unenforceable.10 4  Unless and until surrogate legislation is
adopted, regulations governing IVF and ET could exist independent
of surrogate mother contract arrangements while protecting the fun-
damental right of infertile couples or individuals to resort to IVF
and ET.
D. Welfare of Potential Children Born From IVF and ET
The state interest in the welfare of the child as well as the
child's uncertain legal status can be addressed without infringing
upon a right of access to IVF and ET. Written consent and a legal
presumption that parties will have parental responsibility for resul-
tant offspring would sufficiently advance the state interest in the wel-
fare of the child.'0 5 There would be no issues of illegitimacy and
paternity which would leave the state to provide for the child's wel-
fare. The regulation would not prevent those who desired children
through these procedures from having them. It would merely ensure
that the legal status of the child was not in question and that the
102. See generally Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981) (forbidding payment to a
surrogate mother in connection with an adoption); Noyes v. Thrane, No. CF 7614 (Los Ange-
les County, California, Superior Court, filed Feb. 20, 1981); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 333
N.W.2d 90 (1983) (holding that the Paternity Act does not include the birth of a child result-
ing from a financial transaction involving surrogate motherhood).
103. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1975); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-126(c) (1974); CAL.
PENAL. CODE § 273 (a) (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (1974); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13 § 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(b) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-8-19 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 §§ 1526,1701,1702
(1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West
1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.590 (2) (1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 83 (1981); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 210 § IlA (Michie/Law Coop. 1981); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54
(West Supp. 1983-84); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West
Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37
(Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10(A) (Page 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-6-4.2 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-136 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7203 (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.716 (1982).
104. See supra note 40.
105. The issue of responsibility is much more critical in surrogate situations. There is at
least one case in which none of the parties wanted responsibility for a child born
microcephalic, usually a sign of retardation. The surrogate, Judy Stiver, turned the child over
to Alexander Malahoff who had agreed to pay $10,000. He later rejected the child and denied
paternity. Tests done on live television revealed that he was not the father. The child was
made a ward of the court so that adoption could be arranged, but the child ultimately re-
mained with the surrogate mother. See The N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1983, at 19, cal. 1; Id. at
Feb. 3, 1983, at A16, col. 1; Id. at Feb. 7, 1983, at 10, col. 1; R. Rosenblat, The Baby in the
Factory, TIME, Feb. 14, 1983, at 90.
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appropriate people were charged with responsibility for children
born through these procedures.
VI. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Legislation governing these procedures would solve some of the
legal problems regarding IVF and ET.106 First, it should be re-
quired that those who resort to IVF and ET do so by reason of
infertility. As discussed earlier, a constitutional right to these proce-
dures exists only if a person cannot conceive a child naturally.. Sec-
ond, legislation should provide that if a married woman, with her
husband's consent, resorts to IVF and/or ET using her own or do-
nor ovum and the husband's or donor sperm, she and her husband
would presumptively be the parents of any resultant offspring. If ET
with in vivo fertilization were employed, the parental presumption
should explicitly override the presumption of the artificial insemina-
tion statute which presently treats the sperm recipient and her
spouse as the legal parents.1 07 These provisions would clarify the
legal status of the child. Written agreements, executed by both hus-
band and wife, stipulating to such parental responsibility prior to
either procedure should be required. If donor sperm or ova are used,
all parties, including donors, should agree in writing that donors are
barred from being charged with or asserting parental claims.1 08 This
would insure that donors and potential parents are aware of, and
have consented to, their respective rights and responsibilities.
If a single woman sought access to IVF and/or ET, she alone
should be presumed to have parental responsibility unless another
person consented in writing to share such obligation. A provision re-
garding donors should apply to insure knowledge of rights and con-
sent to responsibility.
In addition, would-be parents should be required to provide for
the disposition of the embryo(s) should the parents die or divorce
before implantation. A similar provision should provide for the dis-
position of any "extra" embryos. This would alleviate uncertainty as
106. It must be emphasized that the proposal suggested is intended to cover only the
clinical context of the procedures. Further, the provision regarding parental responsibility and
extinction of donor rights would have to be modified were the surrogate situation to become
legally recognized.
107. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
108. For such a provision to cover surrogate situations, it might be required of all par-
ties to stipulate prior to the procedure who would be charged with parental responsibility and
who would be barred from asserting parental rights. Problems might still exist, however, be-
cause of the present uncertainty of the enforceability of surrogate contracts. See supra note 40.
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to whether the embryo(s) should be donated for research, frozen for
later use, or implanted in other women.' 09 If the embryos are
donated for research, such research must conform to the fetal re-
search statute110 as well as any other restrictions adopted in the fu-
ture to govern research on embryos. If the would-be parents specify
that embryos will be frozen or donated, such specifications would
have to conform to any future regulations governing embryo freezing
and donating."'
There should also be a provision establishing a standard of due
care for physicians. This standard should require available tests to
be administered in order to screen out known causes of birth defects
or diseases."1
Finally, as included in the California artificial insemination
statute," ' there must be a record-keeping requirement that all pa-
pers and documents pertaining to the procedures remain in a perma-
nent file similar to adoption files."" The file must be kept confiden-
tial and subject to inspection only upon a court order showing good
cause. This file is necessary to insure adherence to the above provi-
sions. Consent forms, agreements, and documented tests performed
for donor screening should also be kept.
Any legislation governing IVF and ET would be consistent
with state involvement in areas affecting health, safety, and the gen-
eral welfare."5 Legislation with the above provisions could follow
the current California statute governing artificial insemination."o
Such legislation could be amended or added to as necessary. Amend-
ments would be necessary as related legislation is adopted,' 17 as tech-
109. See supra note 91.
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West Supp. 1983).
111. See supra note 91.
112. See supra note 15.
113. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
114. CAL. CIv. CODE § 227 (West 1986).
The petition, relinquishment, agreement, order, report to the court from
any investigating agency, and any power of attorney and deposition shall be
filed in the office of the county clerk and shall not be open to inspection by any
other than the parties to the action and their attorneys . . . except upon the
written authority of the judge of the superior court. A judge of the superior
court shall not authorize anyone to inspect the petition . . . relinquishment,
agreement, order, report to the court from any investigating agency, or power of
attorney or deposition or any portion of any such documents except in excep-
tional circumstances and for good cause approaching the necessitous.
Id. (emphasis in original).
115. See supra note 45.
116. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1983).
117. See supra note 91.
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nology presents even newer conceptions, or as social policies
change. s The text of the proposed legislation is contained in Ap-
pendix A.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the rate of infertility increases,"' in vitro fertilization and
embryo transfer will be looked to as alternative means of conception.
The more widely available these procedures become, the greater will
be the social problems and legal questions associated with them. Un-
clear rights and liabilities, the unsettled legal status of the embryo,
the social impact of genetic manipulation, and the possibility of
physical and emotional harm to mother and child are only some of
these concerns.
Although regulation of IVF and ET is warranted in light of the
above issues, there are constitutional limitations to government inter-
ference with the fundamental right to have children. The right of
access to these procedures, at least for infertile people, is protected
under the United States Constitution. This right is included within
the right to privacy in connection with marriage, procreation, and
contraception. Still, it is possible to address some of the more com-
pelling state concerns without unreasonably infringing on a funda-
mental right of access to IVF and/or ET if such procedures are nec-
essary for procreation.
The above guidelines suggest regulation of IVF and ET
through provisions which would clarify the legal rights and responsi-
bilities of the parties involved. The destiny of the embryos produced
through IVF and ET must not remain uncertain. Effective donor
screening should be employed as part of a standard of due care.
These provisions balance fundamental individual rights that are in-
volved against the profound social impact of widespread, unrestricted
availability of these techniques.
Helen E. Williams
118. A change in social policy would be an acceptance of surrogate motherhood.
119. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 50. ". . . Reproductive
Endocrinologist Martin Quigley of the Cleveland Clinic calls 'an epidemiS' of infertility in the
U.S. In the past 20 years, the incidence of barrenness has nearly tripled, so that today one in




California Civil Code § 7005.1 In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer.
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician, a husband and
wife are found incapable of conceiving a child due to the infertility of
the husband or the wife, the husband and wife may be permitted to
use in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer to effect conception.
(1) As used in this section, in vitro fertilization means fertiliza-
tion of an egg taken from the woman's body and joined with the
sperm of her husband or a donor and then returned to the woman's
uterus for gestation.
(2) As used in this section, embryo transfer means either:
(a) in vitro fertilization using a donor egg rather than an
egg of the recipient or
(b) in vivo fertilization using a donor egg fertilized in the
donor's body through artificial insemination and then withdrawn
and inserted into the recipient for gestation.
(b) When a married woman, with her husband's consent resorts to
in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer, she and her husband are
treated in law as if they were the natural parents of any child
thereby conceived.
(1) When in vivo fertilization or embryo transfer, as described
in section 7005.1 (a)(2)(b) is utilized, the parental presumption of
the husband and wife utilizing this method shall override that pro-
vided in section 7005 (parental presumption of sperm recipient and
spouse).
(c) Prior to utilizing either in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer,
the husband and wife shall consent in writing to assuming parental
responsibility for any child conceived through in vitro fertilization or
embryo transfer and the husband and wife shall provide such con-
sent signed and in writing. The physician shall certify their signa-
tures and the date of the in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer.
(d) If donor sperm or ova are used in either in vitro fertilization or
embryo transfer, all parties shall consent in writing prior to fertiliza-
tion that the donor(s) are prohibited from asserting, or being charged
with parental responsibility for any child thereby conceived.
(e) Section 7005.1 (a) notwithstanding, a single woman shall not be
denied access to either in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer, pro-
vided that her use of either in vitro fertilization or embryo transfer is
supervised and approved by a licensed physician who has determined
that the woman is incapable of conceiving a child without in vitro
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fertilization or embryo transfer.
(1) The single woman who utilizes in vitro fertilization or em-
bryo transfer shall be treated in law as the natural parent of any
child thereby conceived. She shall have sole parenthood responsibility
unless another person consents in writing to share such obligation.
(2) When a single woman utilizes in vitro fertilization or em-
bryo transfer, donor(s) of sperm or ova shall consent in writing prior
to fertilization that the donor(s) are prohibited from asserting, or be-
ing charged with parental responsibility for any child thereby
conceived.
(f) Prior to fertilization, the husband and wife or single woman who
utilize in vitro fertilization with any donor(s) of sperm or ova shall
provide in writing for the disposition of the embryo(s) should the
husband and wife divorce or die before implantation, or should the
single woman die before implantation.
(1) The written agreement provided in section 7005.1 (f) shall
also provide for the disposition of any extra embryos. If such extra
embryos are to be donated for research, then such research shall con-
form to Cal. Health & Safety Code section 25956 (fetal research). If
such extra embryo(s) are to be frozen, the agreement shall identify
the ultimate beneficiary or beneficiaries of the embryo(s).
(g) Licensed physicians who supervise in vitro fertilization or em-
bryo transfer shall be required to administer normal medical tests to
reduce the chances of birth defects or disease. Such tests shall in-
clude, but not be limited to: venereal disease, hepititis, Aquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome, Tay-Sachs, sickle cell anemia, as well as
those tests which identify alcoholism and drug abuse.
(h) The written agreement specified in subsection (c), (d), (e), or (f)
of section 7005.1 shall be kept as part of the medical record and
shall be kept in a sealed file available to an interested party showing
good cause to a judge of the superior court.
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